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Introduction: The Indiana Act in Context
The malpractice "crisis" defies definition. The scope of the prob-
lem and its solution are dependent upon the perspective from which the
crisis is observed. In this sense all proposed "solutions" to the crisis
must be evaluated in terms of their effect upon those elements of the
malpractice problem which they are specifically designed to remedy, as
well as upon those elements of the problem which they are required, by
the limitations of their focus, to ignore.
From the perspective of the medical profession, the malpractice
dilemma encompasses two distinct elements. First, the uneven applica-
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tion of legal doctrines to professional liability cases' has forced physi-
cians to employ practices which they might not normally employ, and
to refrain from procedures they might otherwise employ, for fear of
increasing the potential for a malpractice action. These are the basic
considerations which are embodied in the phrases "positive"' and "nega-
tive"3 defensive medicine. A distinguished panel has recently designated
five areas in which the law has been applied unevenly, to the prejudice
of health care professionals.' In summary form, these are:
(1) the doctrine of informed consent to treatment,
(2) the discovery rule under the statute of limitations,
(3) the terms of the statute of limitations,
(4) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and
(5) liability for breach of express contracts.
The second element of the malpractice problem perceived by the
medical profession can loosely be described as the crisis of liability in-
surance coverage. The new physician, the intern, and the once-negligent
practitioner may find liability coverage most difficult to obtain.' This
ISee U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].2 Defensive medicine refers to "the alteration of modes of medical practice, induced by
the threat of liability," CommissioN REPORT at 14. Positive defensive medicine is "the
conducting of a test or performance of a diagnostic or therapeutic procedure which is not
medically justified but is carried out primarily (if not solely) to prevent or defend against
the threat of medical legal liability." Id.3 Negative defensive medicine "occurs when a physician does not perform a procedure
or conduct a test because of the physician's fear of a later malpractice suit, even though
the patient is likely to benefit from the test or procedure in question." Id.
Defensive medicine can also involve a doctor's reluctance to publish case reports of
adverse effects of diagnostic or therapeutic treatment for fear they will be used as evidence
in a lawsuit. See generally A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 414-15 (1975); Bernz-
weig, Defensive Medicine in CommIssION REPORT, Appendix 38; STAFF OF THE SEsNAT
Comm. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT
VERsus TH PHiySICIAN 2 (Comm. Print 1969); Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat:
A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939.
1 Cosmm ssmN REPORT at 31. The Commission also recommended that a broad-based
group, representing the health care system, the legal profession, and the general public, de-
velop appropriate definitions and guidelines in the form of a Restatement of the Law of
Medical-Legal Principles.
Such a Restatement would, at the least, focus on some of the legal rules and doctrines
which have created considerable confusion, for example,
(a) informed consent;
(b) res ipsa loquitur;
(c) the locality rule;
(d) evidentiary rules relating to the qualification of expert witnesses;
(e) discovery rule, as applied to statutes of limitations;
(f) oral guarantees of results of treatment; and
(g) definitions of death and other medical-legal questions involved in treatment of
dying patients.5 Id. Gills, Insurance Crisis: Availability to Physicians in Jeopardy, in 3 AmICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS AssocIATIoN, QUALIT MEDICAL CARE-THE CITIZEN'S RIGIHT at 1235
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element of the crisis has manifested itself in the near shutdown of
emergency services at several Indiana hospitals,6 and the withdrawal
of a number of policy writers from this field of insurance Physicians
and surgeons in the so-called "high risk" categories' face insurance
premiums so high that it is not unusual to hear of specialists who aban-
don their chosen fields for lower risk practices.
The patient's position in the malpractice dilemma is more simply
stated and less susceptible to inflated or self-serving presentation than
that of the medical profession. Medical services are being priced out
of the range of the typical consumer. Indeed, the presumed inelasticity
of medical service demand is open to question as some patients refrain
from all but the most essential medical services. Defensive medical
practices have inflated the costs of even the simplest services, and ever-
increasing insurance premiums are inevitably passed on to the patient
through increased service costs. Beyond doubt, the ultimate loser in
the malpractice crisis is the medical consumer.
It is conceivable that the continuous rise in the number of mal-
practice claims commenced,9 and claim files opened,1  can be traced to
the fact that the patient, burdened with the increasing costs of medical
services and the profession's proclivity for defensive medical techniques,
has come to expect a greater degree of expertise from the physician
than medical science can presently provide. Indeed, the large volume of
(1975); Cast, Indiana's Medical Liability Problem, 68 J. IND. ST. MED. Ass'N. 21 (1975);
Little, Malpractice Insurance Costs Hurt Public Too, Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, Nov.
14, 1974, at lB. See generally Van Valkenburg, Can Our Courts be Saved?, 50 Mrcr. ST.
B.J. 75 (1971).
6See Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan. 13, 1975, at 1.
7 See Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable?, 51 IND. L.J. 128 n.1 (1975), infra; Gray,
The Insurer's Dilemma, 51 IND. L.J. 120, 127 (1975), infra; Fort Wayne News-Sentinel,
June 13, 1975, at 20B.
8 Physicians are divided into various risk classes, depending upon the risk of mal-
practice, and young doctors in "Class 5" specialties such as orthopedic surgeons, neuro-
surgeons, cancer therapists, psychiatric shock therapists, obstretricians, and anesthesiologists,
sometimes cannot get insurance at all. Little, Malpractice Insurance Costs Hurt Public
Too, Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, Nov. 14, 1974, at B.
9 The Indiana State Medical Association reports that the number of suits filed has
increased 64 percent since 1969. Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan. 14, 1975, at 1.
10 On the average working day in 1970, the 26 or so major malpractice insurance
companies opened approximately 70 medical malpractice claim files, or about
18,000 files for the year. Not all of these files represented malpractice claims
made by or on behalf of patients. In fact, based upon comparable data for files
closed in 1970, only 70% (or about 12,600) of the files represented claims asserted
by patients; the remaining 30 percent were files that in all likelihood will be
closed without a claim ever being made. Insurance companies opened these pre-
claim files solely on the basis of reports by insured doctors and hospitals of
adverse medical incidents or threats made by patients.
ComarssioN REroRT at 6 (footnote omitted). Cf. id., Figure 1, at 7.
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successful malpractice suits," and the hyperbolic increase in jury dam-
age awards, 2 lend credence to such a theory.
Finally, the malpractice crisis is a crisis of the insurance industry
itself. The increasing frequency of claims and the unpredictability of
jury awards are said to render intelligent ratemaking impossible. In-
surers are rushing to abandon the professional liability field.'"
Proposals for salvaging the competitive' 4 professional liability in-
surance industry abound. The plan most often discussed calls for tran-
sition from a claims-incurred basis for coverage to a claims-made sys-
tem similar to that traditionally employed by Lloyds of London.'" Even
this technical change has met continued resistance from insurers.' 6
The legal profession has not been immune to criticism with respect
to the malpractice crisis. In fact, it is not unusual to find responsibility
placed squarely upon the broad shoulders of the plaintiffs' bar. In par-
ticular, the contingent fee system has been the object of passionate
criticism, and repeated calls have been made for its modification or
abolition.'"
Thus, it is evident that the malpractive crisis is multifaceted and
capable of assessment from a number of competing perspectives. Not
surprisingly, these divergent perspectives have given rise to an ever-
increasing number of proposals for remedial legislation, as well as re-
forms initiated by the judiciary, the medical profession, and the insur-
ance industry.
THE QUEST FOR REFORM
Three major categories of remedial action have been proposed as
"solutions" to the malpractice crisis. The first category consists of pro-
posals directed to the insurance industry and to the mechanisms cur-
rently employed, through professional liability coverage, to compensate
11 See CommiassIoN REPORT at 10.
"See Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan. 14, 1975, at 1; CoiassssioN REPORT
at 10; U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 20, 1975, at 53.
1 aSee note 7 supra.
14 See generally Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable?, 51 IND. L.J. 128, 132-33 (1975), infra.
" Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, CoMMIssioN REPORT,
Appendix 494, at 508. See text accompanying notes 19-22 infra.
16 COM IsSION REPORT, Appendix 494, at 508. See also Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable?
51 IND. L.J. 128, 131 (1975), infra.
"
7 See F. MACKINNIN, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964). For a general
discussion of the contingent fee problem, see Mallor, A Cure for the Plaintiff's ills?, 51
IND. L.J. 103, 118 (1975), infra; Stewart, The Malpractice Problen--Its Cause and Cure:
The Physician's Perspective, 51, IND. L.J. 134, 138 (1975), infra. But see CoMM&sSioN
REPORT at 32-33, which contends that the contingent fee system does not encourage litiga-
tion, nor does it grossly over-compensate plaintiff's attorneys for legal services rendered.
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the malpractice victim and to protect the physician from personal lia-
bility for his actions. The second category embraces proposals for re-
form of the traditional tort litigation process as it applies to malprac-
tice actions. Finally, there are proposals to eliminate the litigation
process in the malpractice area, and to substitute various procedures in
place of trial by jury.
Ratemaking and premium determination are complex actuarial
processes."8 As noted above, the malpractice crisis has apparently ren-
dered intelligent ratemaking impossible, and has stimulated insurers
and insurance industry analysts to seek modifications of the present sys-
tem which will help to re-establish professional liability insurance as a
profitable, and actuarially sound, enterprise.
Under the standard "claims-incurred" coverage, the insured is
covered for any claim arising from an incident which occurred, or is
alleged to have occurred, during the policy period, regardless of when
the claim is actually made.' 9 The uncertainty inherent in this system
has spurred proposals for adoption of "claims-made" coverage, in which
the insured is covered for any claim made while the policy is in force."0
Coverage ceases when the policy lapses. Furthermore, claims-made poli-
cies are usually written to exclude claims based on incidents occurring
prior to the effective date of the policy.2 ' Thus, a degree of actuarial
certainly could be added to the writing of professional liability policies.
Nevertheless, many carriers have voiced opposition to such coverage
unless the entire system of professional liability insurance is converted
to claims-made policies.2
The proposals for modification of the tort litigation process are
nearly as numerous and cumbersome as some elements of the process
itself. The abolition, or at least the restriction of, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in medical cases has been suggested." Similarly, calls for
18 See generally Gray, The Insurer's Dilemma, 51 IND. LJ. 120 (1975), infra; and
Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable? 51 I2n. L.J. 128 (1975), infra.
1 9 See Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, CoMmsIssiON
REPORT, Appendix 494, at 508; see also Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable?, 51 IND. L.J.
128, 131 (1975), infra.
20 See Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, CoMlISSiON
REPoRT, Appendix 494, at 508. See also Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable? 51 IND. L.J. 128,
131 (1975), infra.
21 Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, CozaaSSlON REPoRT,
Appendix 494, at 508.22 Id. Of course, the situation would then leave the physician uncovered for claims
incurred under the prior system but made under a claims-made system in which the
policy excluded claims based on incidents prior to the effective policy date. It would
appear that, at least initially, claims-made policies could not be written to exclude prior
claims, or the physician will be unprotected against so called "long tail" actions.2
' Interestingly, in Alaska, the first state in the nation to eliminate the applicability
of res ipsa loquitur, approximately 20 percent of the physicians in the state are now
1975]
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the restriction of the evolving doctrine of informed consent to treat-
ment24 are not uncommon. A few commentators who have focused on
the troublesome area of contractual liability of physicians have argued
for modification of the present evidentiary rules.25 Moreover, a federal
commission studying the malpractice crisis has concluded that profes-
sionals should not be singled out for uneven or biased application of
the law.26
The principal focus of discussion in recent years has been upon
alternatives to the tort litigation process. Numerous articles have care-
fully described the "deleterious consequences" which result from the
present fault-liability approach to resolving malpractice claims. One
article has summarized these consequences as follows:
A. Patient-Claimant
* Difficulty in uncovering medical evidence to prove provider
negligence
* High cost of pursuing claims through legal channels thereby
requiring the payment of large attorney fees (high contin-
gency fee percentage and expenses) in the event of favor-
able disposition
* Difficulty in obtaining competent legal assistance for rela-
tively minor claims thereby discouraging their filing
* Ambivalence in subjecting health care provider to stigma and
adverse publicity
" Large disparity of awards and settlements for comparable in-
juries and circumstances
• Induces the patient-claimant to exaggeration and fraud.
practicing without any form of malpractice insurance. Malpractice Laws After Six Months:
Some Progress: More Problems, 16 MEDIcAL WORLD N-ws 76, 81 (1975).
24 A patient must be given sufficient information about the risks possible in a course
of treatment, to allow him to give an effective or informed consent after an intelligent
evaluation of the choices available. This may impose an unreasonable responsibility on
the physician. CoMinssloN REPORT at 29-30. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
See generally Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 340 (1974).
2 5 Indeed, some authors have proposed that any contractual liability be based on
written contracts. See Tierney, Contractual Aspects of Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REv.
1457 (1973); Note, Express Contracts to Cure: The Nature of Contractual Malpractice,
50 IND. L.J. 361 (1975).
The 1975 Indiana Medical Malpractice Act takes this approach. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-4
(Burns Supp. 1975). See Appendix, infra.
26 CoMMISSION REPORT at 31.
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B. Health-Care Provider
" Long delays cause anxiety as to outcome of claims
" Negative reflection on professional stature
* Impedes the willingness to apply new techniques in favor of
tried and proven procedures
" Degrades the relationship with patient by introducing suspi-
cion and hostility
" Encourages practice of defensive medicine
" Results in loss of time from practice in preparing for defense.
C. Insurance Carrier
" Incurs large administrative costs
* Presents difficulties in setting actuarially-sound rates because
of low predictability of number of claims and their disposi-
tions, and size of settlements and awards.
D. Public-at-Large
" Increases cost of health care as a result of the alleged prac-
tice of defensive medicine and need to offset high malpractice.
insurance costs of health care providers and institutions
" Delays introduction of improvements in the delivery of health
care services because of threat of malpractice claims as per-
ceived by health care providers."
In response, a number of proposed plans for statutory non-fault
based compensation systems have been presented." Such a plan has re-
cently been enacted in New Zealand.29 In fact, judges in at least two
noteworthy cases have advocated judicial imposition of strict liability
2 7 Roth & Rosenthal, Non Fault Based Medical Injury Compensation Systems, CoM-
MISSION REPORT, Appendix 450, at 457.
" See, e.g., A. HOLDER, MfEDICAL AkLPRACTICE LAW 431-34 (1975); J. O'CoNNELL,
ADDING INSULT TO INJURY (1975); Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insur-
ance: A Needed First Step Toward Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice",
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1964); Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 459 (1972); Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insur-
anc"--A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 HEALTH
AND Soc'Y 125 (1973); O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some
Proposals, 59 VA. L. Rev. 749 (1973); O'Connell, It's Time for No Fault for All Kinds of
Injuries, 60 A.B.A.J. (1974); O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Insurance For Many Kinds
of Accidents: A Proposal and an "Economic Analysis", 42 TENN. L. REv. 145 (1974); Roth
& Rosenthal, Non Fault Based Medical Injury Compensation Systems, Comassiox RePoRT,
Appendix 450. But see Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. Rev.
590, 616 (1973).
29See Bernstein, "No-Fault" Compensation For Personal Injury in New Zealand,
COMaSiSON REPORT, Appendix 836.
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for medical maloccurrences.3 ° Courts have been hesitant to adopt such
a procedure,3 and it would appear that implementation of such a non-
fault based compensation system is more properly a function of the
legislature than of the courts.
Perhaps the most widely discussed modification of, or alternative
to, the present litigation system has been the screening panel approach.32
The panel approach defies concise explanation, since panels have been
proposed for widely divergent purposes, and there is no agreement on
the composition of the panel. For example, under a statutory procedure
which went into effect on January 1, 1972 in New Hampshire, claims
against doctors, lawyers, and dentists are heard by three-member panels
consisting of one state court judge, one member of the public, and one
member of the profession against whom the claim was filed.33 In two
counties in New York, and on a statewide basis in New Jersey, the
courts have established screening panels with membership markedly dif-
ferent from the New Hampshire plan." Among the other plans which
have been proposed, or which have taken effect, the plan currently em-
ployed in Pima County, Arizona, has received the most attention.
3 5
Arbitration is another alternative which has been suggested as a
substitute for the litigation process. 6 The Ross-Loos Medical Group,
30 Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal.2d 399, 414, 426 P.2d 525, 535, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 135
(1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring); Heuing v. Carey, 84 Wash.2d 514, 521-22, 519 P.2d
981, 984-85 (1974) (three justices concurring).
31 See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App.3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971) (drug
reaction); Silverman v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971)
(broken surgical needle); Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363
(1972) (plastic surgery); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Co.
Ct. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub. nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 225-41, 241
A.2d 637, 638-47 (1968) (dissent advocated strict liability), aff'd per curian, 53 N.J.
259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
32 See A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 416-23 (1975); Winikoff, Medical-
Legal Screening Panel as an Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice, 13 Wm. & MARY
L. Rgv. 695 (1972); Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, I: Technical
Analysis, CoMMIssIoN REPORT, Appendix 214.
"
3 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 519-A (1974). The decision of the panel is not final; it
may be accepted or rejected by the parties who may thereafter settle or sue.
14 Under the New York plan, the panel consists of a physician, always a specialist
in the field of the patient's complaint, a member of the New York City Bar, and an
appellate judge. The New Jersey plan uses a panel consisting of two physicians, two at-
torneys, and a judge who acts as chairman. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 420
(1975). See generally note 37 infra.
"s See, e.g., Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, I: Technical
Analysis, CommissION REPORT, Appendix 214, at 248-50 (comparing Pima and Maricopa
County is Arizona); Mallor, A Cure for the Plaintiff's Ills?, 51 IND. L.J. 103, 109-10 (1975),
in/ra.
a6 The following summary of screening panel systems is adopted from Baird, Munster-
man & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, I: Technical Analysis, ComanssIoN REPORT, Ap-
pendix 214, at 280-81.
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which furnishes pre-paid health care to some 90,000 California sub-
scribers, has required an arbitration provision in all subscription agree-
The form, purpose, and essential characteristics of the alternative plans to
litigation are discussed in the paragraphs which follow.
Physician Screening Panels
These panels are usually composed solely or predominantly of doctors, who
advise potential defendant doctors and their insurers whether to defend or settle
claims made against them. Although many medical associations throughout the
country have had one of these peer review or defense advisory committees
for many years, only the following representative sample was reviewed:
" Idaho Medical Association, "Mediation Committee"
* Maine Medical Association, "Medical Advisory Committee"
" Medical Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland, "Physicians' Defense Committee"
" New Hampshire Medical Society, "Committee on Jurisprudence"
" Oregon Medical Association, "Professional Consultation Committee"
" Rhode Island Medical Society, "Committee on Mediation"
Physidan-and-Advisory Screening Panels
In two instances, physicians supplemented their decision-making panel member-
ship by including representatives of other professions:
* Honolulu (Hawaii) Medical Society, "Medical Practices Committee," which
includes an attorney and a member of the clergy
* King County (Washington) Medical Society and Seattle-King County Bar
Association, "Professional Liability Panel," which includes one member of
the local bar association
Medical-Legal Screening Panels
These plans comprise the largest category. Plans listed below, from all known
and existing screening panels, were reviewed:
" Alaska Bar Association Medical-Legal Committee
" Pima County (Arizona) Bar Association and Pima County Medical Society,
"Medical Legal Plan"
* Maricopa County (Arizona) Bar Association and Maricopa County Medical
Society, "Pima Plan for Medical Malpractice Claims"
" Colorado Bar Association and Colorado Medical Society, "Joint Medico-Legal
Plan for Screening Medical Professional Liability Cases"
" Joint Medico-Legal Committee of the Delaware Bar Association and Dela-
ware Medical Society, "Joint Medico-Legal Plan for Screening Medical Mal-
practice Cases"
" Hillsborough County (Florida) Medical Association and the Tampa-Hills-
borough County Bar Association, "Joint Medical-Legal Committee"
" South Central Idaho Medical Society and Bar Association of the 4th
and 11th Judicial Districts of Idaho, "Joint Medico-Legal Plan for Screening
Medical Malpractice Cases"
" Scott County (Iowa) Bar Association and Scott County Medical Society,
"Joint Interprofessional Relations Committee of the Scott County Medical
Society and the Scott County Bar Association"
" Cumberland County (Maine) Medical Association and the Cumberland
County Bar Association, "Medical-Legal Review Committee"
" Androscoggin County (Maine) Bar Association and Androscoggin County
Medical Society, "Joint Medical-Legal Plan for Medical Malpractice Cases"
* Montana Medical Association and Montana Bar Association, "Medical-
Legal Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Cases"
" State Bar of Nevada and the Nevada State Medical Association, "Joint
Medical-Legal Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Cases"
" New Mexico Medical Society and State Bar of New Mexico, "Joint Medical
Legal Plan for Screening Medical Negilgence Cases"
" Legal-Medical Committee of the Nassau County (New York) Bar Asso-
ciation and the Nassau County Medical Society, "Impartial Legal-Medical
Advisory Panel"
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ments since 1930."* Data from this system indicate that the arbitra-
tion approach has been uniquely successful.38 In Philadelphia and Alle-
gheny County, Pennsylvania courts have initiated a rule requiring arbi-
tration of all tort disputes involving less than $10,000."
" Suffolk County (New York) Medical Society and the Suffolk County Bar
Association, "Joint Medical-Legal Program for Binding Arbitration of
Medical Malpractice Cases"
" Academy of Medicine of Columbus and Franklin Counties (Ohio) and
Columbus Bar Association, "Franklin County Medical Arbitration Plan"
" Montgomery County (Ohio), "Medical Arbitration Plan"
" Berks County (Pennsylvania) Medical Society and Berks County Bar
Association, "Joint Medico-Legal Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice
Cases"
" Philadelphia County (Pennsylvania) Medical Society and Philadelphia Bar
Association, "Professional Liability Consultation Service"
* Joint Medico-Legal Committee of the Medical Society for Virginia and
Virginia State Bar, "Joint Screening Panel of the Medical Society of Virginia
and Virginia State Bar"
" Pierce County (Washington) Medical-Legal Committee
" Spokane County (Washington), "Medical-Legal Panel for the Review of
Possible Medical Malpractice Suits"
* Milwaukee County (Wisconsin), "Medical-Legal Panel Regarding Advisory
Determination of Claims Allegedly Arising From Medical Malpractice"
Court-Sponsored Screening Panels
Two jurisdictions have established panels under the sponsorship of the courts
for screening medical malpractice claims. Plans analyzed in this category were:
" State of New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts, "Rule 4:21-
Professional Liability Against Members of the Medical Profession"
* New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Judicial Department,
"Medical Malpractice Mediation Program"
Statutory Plan
Only one state, New Hampshire, has recognized the institution of the screen-
ing panel through its legislature:
* New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, Section 519-A:1 to 519-A:10,
"Professional Malpractice Claims" (effective January 1, 1972)
Arbitration Plans
Arbitration includes procedures contracted for by the parties, in which they
agree to substitute a private forum for the courts for the resolution of their disputes.
The following arbitration plans were examined:
* California Hospital Association and California Medical Association, "Hos-
pital Arbitration Regulations" and "Conditions for Admission"
* Southern California Kaiser Foundation, "1971 Amendment to Group
Medical and Hospital Service Agreement of the Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc."
* Ross-Loos Medical Group, Los Angeles, California
* Casualty Indemnity Exchange, Denver, Colorado, "Application, Treat-
ment, and Arbitration Agreement"
37 A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 423 (1975). See generally Rubsamen, The
Experience of Binding Arbitration in the Ross-Loos Medical Group, CosmmssioN REPORT,
Appendix 424.
38 Few claims against the group (about 160 physicians and some 400 other personnel)
have gone to full arbitration and most are settled prior to that point at an average
annual cost of about $30,000. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 423 (1975); see
generally Rubsamen, The Experience of Binding Arbitration in the Ross-Loos Medical
Group, CommissIoN REPORT, Appendix 424, at 427-44, for analysis of 35 closed cases.
39A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw 423 (1975); ComaIssloN REPORT at 92.
The ComiSSIO N REPORT recommends more widespread use of imposed arbitration as an
alternative method for resolving malpractice disputes. Id. at 93-94.
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CONCLUSION
This discussion of suggested solutions to the malpractice "crisis"
is by no means exhaustive. Nor is it intended to be. Instead, this brief
introduction is designed to illustrate the context in which the Indiana
legislature developed its own unique approach to the malpractice di-
lemma. Obviously, the success of the new Indiana procedure, as well
as the success of other alternatives to the current system, is dependent
not only upon the procedure's acceptability to the medical service con-
sumer, but also upon its reception in the medical, legal, and insurance
communities. Whether the Indiana Act will gain the approval of these
varied constituencies remains to be seen.
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APPENDIX
MALPRACTICE LAWS BY STATE AS OF MID-JULY 1975
Alabama- Employers of Wassara
Alaska Mutual F.I.M.
Arizona Travelers
Arkansas * *St. Paul
California* Argonaut Travelers
Colorado Hartford
Connecticut Aetna
Delaware Aetna
Florida * 100 * 4 Argonaut
Georgia * St. Paul
Hawaii * Argonaut
Idaho * 150 * St. Paul
Illinois o 500 5 Hartford
Indiana * * 100 * * 2 15t * Medical Protective
Iowa * * 6 : * Medical Protectiva
Kansas -,- - Medical Protethre
Kentucky Medical Protec*e
Louisiana * 100 * * 50 * Hartford
Maine * - Hartford
Maryland * Self Insurance Plan
Massachuett * - - * 3 - St. Paul
Michigan- * * 21/ NJ. * Medical Protectiv
Minnesota St. Paul
Mississippi St. Paul
Missouri 2 Medical Protective
Montana -- Aetna
Nebraska * St. Paul
Nevada * Imperial
New Hampshire * * Hartford
Now Jersey NJ. Chubb&Son
New Mexico Travelers
New York * " JUA-SelfI.ns.
North Carolina * St. Paul
North Dakota * 6 St. Paul
Ohio- Medical Protective
Oklahoma Ins. CO. of N.
Oregon * * * 5 33 * CNA conglomerate
Pennsylvania- Medical Protective
Rhode Island It * St. Paul
South Carolina * * St. Paul
South Dakota 6 * St. Paul
Tennessee - * * 3 33y/ Shelby Mutal
Teens * 2 * Medical Protecthe
Utah Aetna
Vermont I Aetna
Virginia St. Paul
Washington - Aetna
West Virginia * Aetna
Wisconsln * 200 * Medical Prtbzw
Wyoming * Aetna
;Legislature still in session
IOn fees calleoted from catastrophic fund
,Court decides fees.
Ciass 1 and 2: $100,000
Clas 3 and4: 300.000
Class 5 and 6 500,000
ttlao.statutory
N.J. The so-called New Jersey rule, based on a gliding scale.
as follows:
40% on first $5.000
33% % on next $45,000
20% on net $50.000
10% of anything over $100,000
(In N.J. this le Ca nostalutory.
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